Earl C. Jackson v. Kaiser Steel Corporation, the Uninsured Employer\u27s Fund, the Employers Reinsurance Fund, and the Industrial Commission of Utah: Brief of Petitioner by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Earl C. Jackson v. Kaiser Steel Corporation, the
Uninsured Employer's Fund, the Employers
Reinsurance Fund, and the Industrial Commission
of Utah: Brief of Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Virginius Dabney; attorney for petitioner.
Benjamin A. Sims, Utah Industrial Commisison; Erie V. Boorman, Employers' Reinsurance Fund;
Edwin C. Barnes, Clyde, Pratt, and Snow; attorneys for respondents.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Jackson v. Kaiser Steel, No. 920804 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3812
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 - = - ra = 
jffiyrr Mn jf^gdjm^JgjCOURT OF APPEALS 
EARL C. JACKSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KAISER STEEL CORPORATION 
[Uninsured, Insolvent Employer], 
the UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND, 
the EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE 
FUND, and the INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 920804-CA 
Priority No. 7 
B R I E F OF P E T I T I O N E R 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF 
DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR REVIEW OF 
ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq. 
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
P.O. BOX 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Attorney for Industrial 
Commission of Utah 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq. 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
Post Office Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorney for Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund 
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
201 South Main, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-208 
Attorney for Kaiser Steel 
Corporation and the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund 
Virginius Dabney, Esq. 
DABNEY & DABNEY, p.c. 
350 South 400 East, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Petitioner 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAR 2 3 1993 
J* Mary T. Noonan 
Y Clerk of the Court 
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S 
Page 
Table of Authorities ii 
Jurisdiction of the Court 1 
Statement of the Issue(s)/Standard of Appellate Review . . . . 1 
Determinative Statute(s)/Rule(s) 2 
Statement of the Case 2 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Course of Proceedings 2 
C. Disposition Below . . . 2 
D. Statement of the Facts 3 
Summary of Argument(s) 5 
Argument 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO APPLY THE 
REMEDIAL PRINCIPLE THAT THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF AWARDING 
BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO COVERAGE ARE TO BE 
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED WORKER 5 
II. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO FIND THAT 
PETITIONER EXPERIENCED A COMPENSABLE 
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT 11 
III. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO APPLY THE "ODD 
LOT" DOCTRINE TO PETITIONER'S PERMANENT, TOTAL 
DISABILITY CLAIM, AND SUCH APPLICATION RESULTS IN A 
PRESUMPTION OF ENTITLEMENT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN 
REBUTTED 13 
Conclusion/Statement of Relief Sought 17 
Addendum 20 
i 
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S 
CASES 
Page 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) . . . 11 
Askrew v. Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964) . . . 6 
Baker v. Industrial Commission, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) 6 
Brundage v. IML Freight. Inc., 
622 P.2d 790 (Utah 1980) 13 
Caillet v. Industrial Commission, 
58 P.2d 760 (Utah 1936) 13 
Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 
184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919) 6 
Clark v. Interstate Homes, Inc., 
604 P.2d 937 (Utah 1979) 13 
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984) . . . . 13 
Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990) . . 5, 11 
J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983) 5 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission.. 
709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985) 13 
M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 
189 P. 2d 132 (Utah 1948) 6 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission. 
681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984) 13, 14 
Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review. 
817 P. 2d 328 (Utah 1991) 1 
Morton International. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah 
State Tax Commission. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991) 1 
Prows v. Industrial Commission. 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980) . . . 6 
Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Commission. 
766 P. 2d 1089 (Utah App. 1988) 11 
ii 
State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 
685 P. 2d 1051 (Utah 1984) 5 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 
393 P.2d 800 (Utah 1964) 13 
8TATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1971) 2 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53(2) (1988) 1 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-86 (1988) 1 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16 (1988) 1 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(c) (1988) 1 
RULES 
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1 
iii 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's 
November I, Pi'J,' Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Review 
alleging entitlement to workers' compensation benefits sustained as 
a result of an industrial ace At-r - -* - of that 
Order was timely filed with this Court December . 
This Court has jurisdiction etition for Review 
p u r s i M n t *" " I i | i I \M\i i« in |ii »i if ,ai c n j
 p Sect ioi * . --
1-86 (1988); 63-46b-16 (1988); and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule 
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
There i s only one subs tar > 
i.e., whether Mr. Jackson's permanent t * disability status was 
casually related to h Is 1972 industrial accident. The proper 
standard or I'PVIPW < i i in i« i^iest. I on i . ono m "correction of 
error." The real discussion of medical causation occurred in the 
Conclusions of Law section of the Order and as such, those 
c , . ... i r- under the "correction of error" standard 
without deference *  ~ .? agency's view of the law being required. 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah code Annotated, Sect:! on 
6 3 - -16 b • 16 ( A ) 111) (.1 9 8 8 ) Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 
P.2d 328 (Utah 1991). Morton Int'l., Inc. v. Auditing Division of 
the Utah State Tax Commission, 8 i 4 P" ?d '" i K I 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES/RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1971) is the 
determinative statute in this case. It is set forth in full in the 
Addendum hereto as Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Jackson seeks review of the Industrial Commission's Order 
denying his Motion for Review wherein he alleged entitlement to 
workers' compensation occasioned by an April 10, 1972 industrial 
accident. 
Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Jackson filed an application for permanent, total 
disability compensation benefits sustained as the result of his 
industrial injury (R. at 5, 11). Respondents alleged that Mr. 
Jackson failed to prove legal and medical causation and was thus 
not entitled to permanent, total disability benefits. (R. at 20-
22). A Hearing was held on June 23, 1992. (R. at 32). 
Disposition Below 
On July 28, 1992 the Administrative Law Judge held that Mr. 
Jackson had failed to demonstrate sufficient "... evidence of both 
legal and medical causation to rule that the industrial accident 
was a significant cause of Applicant's permanent and total 
disability.11 (R. at 43). His claim for permanent, total disability 
benefits was dismissed, with prejudice, by an Order of the 
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Administrative Law Judge for failure to establish legal and medical 
causation. (R. at 39-44, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit B). 
On August 28, 1992, Mr. Jackson filed a Motion for Review with 
the Industrial Commission (R. at 45-47) which ultimately denied his 
Motion for Review on November 3, 1992 finding a lack of medical 
causation. (R. at 88-93, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit C). 
He challenges that final agency action in this Petition for Review. 
Statement of the Facts 
In 1972 Mr. Jackson was employed by Kaiser Steel Corporation 
as a loader/operator in an underground coal mine in central Utah. 
At that time he was 54 years of age, had a 10th grade education, 
and had worked for 34 years in underground coal mine employment. 
His only other employment was a three-year stint in the military 
service. (R. at 40) . He was also married with three dependent 
children. (R. at 40). 
On or about April 10, 1972, Mr. Jackson was engaged in 
removing an hydraulic roof support in the mine when he stepped on 
a piece of coal causing him to twist his hip injuring his lower 
back. The accident was promptly reported to his supervisor. He 
managed to finish his shift that day and saw Dr. Smoot at the East 
Carbon Medical Clinic shortly thereafter. (R. at 40) . 
Dr. Smoot diagnosed Mr. Jackson as suffering from degenerative 
arthritis of the spine and took him off work. (R. at 190) . He 
received temporary, total disability benefits from his employer, as 
well as an award for 10% whole body permanent, partial impairment, 
all related to his industrial accident. (R. at 9) . His rating 
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increased to 12% as evidenced by a 1992 consultative examination. 
(R. at 186). 
Mr. Jackson attempted to return to work several times during 
the following year, but was unable to work more than three or four 
weeks at a time which precipitated his work termination by his 
employer. He estimated that he only worked about 4-1/2 months 
after his accident. (R. at 40) . Mr. Jackson also stated that pain 
in his back and legs made working in "low coal" difficult. (R. at 
40) . 
The Administrative Law Judge found that he had not worked for 
19 years. (R. at 41) . Mr. Jackson further testified that Dr. 
Smoot had "totaled him out" and rendered him permanently unable to 
work. (R. at 40). He also testified that when he tried to return 
to work, his supervisor at Kaiser Steel told him that he could not 
return to work with a light duty release. (R. at 40) . This 
testimony was uncontroverted, no witnesses appearing on behalf of 
any other party. Medical records either corroborating or 
challenging that testimony could not be found. 
Mr. Jackson never returned to work, and applied the month 
after his work termination from Kaiser Steel for Social Security 
total disability benefits. He was awarded those benefits in 
substantial part due to his industrial injury. His Social Security 
disability award determined that he had been unable to work as of 
April 24, 1973, the date he last worked following his sporadic work 
history after his 1972 industrial injury. (R. at 216-220). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S) 
Mr. Jackson's present permanent total disability is causally 
related in significant part to his 1972 industrial injury. The 
evidence that he sustained an industrial injury on that date was 
overwhelming and largely unrefuted. Although the Petitioner 
clearly had other physical problems, including a pulmonary 
condition, they were only a contributing factor to his disability, 
the main reason for his being unable to work was his injured back. 
This Court should summarily reverse the Industrial 
Commission's final agency action by ruling that Mr. Jackson was 
entitled to the presumption afforded by the "odd lot" doctrine, and 
it was not rebutted as a matter of law in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO APPLY THE REMEDIAL 
PRINCIPLE THAT THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE 
APPLIED LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL 
DOUBTS AS TO COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE 
INJURED WORKER. 
Few principles of workers' compensation law are as well 
established in this State as that workers' compensation disability 
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits, 
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor 
of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this 
principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 
796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990). State Tax Commission v. Industrial 
Commission, supra. J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission. 
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661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983). Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 
1362 (Utah 1980). Baker v. Industrial Commission. 405 P.2d 613 
(Utah 1965). Askrew v. Industrial Commission. 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 
1964). M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 
1948). Chandler v. Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra. discussed the 
proper construction of the Workers' Compensation Act and the 
underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows: 
We are also reminded that our statute requires that 
the statues of this state are to be 'liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice.' 
* * * * * * 
In this connection it must be remembered that the 
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be 
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his 
dependents in case death supervenes. The right to 
compensation arises out of the relation existing between 
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of 
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act 
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or 
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to 
xemployees or other casualties, must be taxed to the 
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the 
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as 
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are 
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs 
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the 
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such 
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those 
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or 
death to provide adequate means for the support of those 
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of 
total disability or death of the employee his dependents 
might become the objects of public charity, such a 
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or 
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right 
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the 
cost of producing and selling the product of such 
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such 
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason, 
if for no other. should receive a very liberal 
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construction in favor of the injured employee. We are 
all united upon the proposition that in view of the 
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as 
the case may be. Id. at 1021-1022, (Emphasis added) 
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering her Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and the Industrial Commission in affirming 
her Order, failed to apply this vital rule of construction. 
Nowhere in the Findings, Conclusions or Order is there any evidence 
of a "liberal construction" or the "resolution of doubt in favor of 
the claim". Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in the 
record, the Administrative Law Judge construed it against the 
injured employee, highlighting insignificant and immaterial 
differences in the record. In addition, the Administrative Law 
Judge and the Industrial Commission both selectively stressed Mr. 
Jackson's pulmonary condition and virtually ignored his 
industrially injured back. 
For example, the Administrative Law Judge referenced Dr. 
Lawson's medical records for their failure to "... mention a causal 
link with the accident." (R. at 41). The Industrial Commission 
similarly argued by stating that "Dr. Lawson considered Jackson's 
pulmonary condition and back and leg pain to be his principal 
disabling conditions in 1974, but did not mention a causal 
connection with the industrial accident." (R. at 90). However, 
Kaiser Steel in fact paid temporary, total and a substantial 
permanent, partial rating due to the back impairment related to his 
1972 industrial accident, and hence, Dr. Lawson's alleged failure 
to reference the industrial accident is really of no significance. 
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Nevertheless, this myopic approach by the Industrial Commission to 
Dr. Lawson's Report is illustrative of its improper view of this 
claim. 
Second, the Social Security Administration's award of 
entitlement for total disability was premised upon both his back 
condition (related to the industrial accident) as well as his 
pulmonary condition. Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge 
referenced his Social Security award as one having been issued "... 
on the basis of pulmonary condition ....'• (R. at 41). Not only 
did the Administrative Law Judge construe the Social Security award 
against Mr. Jackson, but she also incorrectly referenced only a 
part of the basis for the award. 
Third, the 19-year period between the date of his industrial 
accident and his filing of an application for benefits was cited as 
a reason for questioning Mr. Jackson's credibility. There is 
nothing contained in the Workers Compensation Act that requires a 
timely filing of a claim for permanent, total disability. It is 
submitted that the greater the time period between the date of the 
industrial accident and the filing of an Application for Hearing is 
not relevant to the credibility issue. Once again, a minor and 
immaterial fact was erroneously construed against Mr. Jackson's 
claim. 
Fourth, the Administrative Law Judge placed improper reliance 
upon Dr. Hess' opinion that Mr. Jackson's lung condition - 20 years 
after his industrial accident - appeared to be his major problem. 
Obviously, Mr. Jackson's condition in 1992 is not reflective of the 
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medical problems that prevented him from working 20 years ago. 
That he was awarded Social Security total disability benefits based 
upon a back which has only minimally increased in impairment over 
the years, and a lung condition which appears to be significant 
now, does not establish that the cause of Mr. Jackson's inability 
to work in 1972 was his pulmonary condition - particularly where 
his uncontroverted testimony is to the effect that his continuing 
back problems prevented him from successfully returning to work. 
This is further true where there is absolutely no evidence in this 
record indicating that the reason he was prevented from continuing 
working was anything other than his back condition 20 years ago. 
The simple fact of the matter is Mr. Jackson worked with his lung 
condition - whatever it was - for almost 34 years in underground 
coal mine employment, and it was not until he experienced a severe 
industrial injury to his lower back in 1972 at age 54 that he was 
unable to continue working or return to work after obtaining 
medical treatment for his back. 
Fifth, the Industrial Commission indicated there was little 
"evidence" to support a finding of medical causation citing the 
lack of medical records immediately following the industrial 
accident over 20 years ago; and the fact that Mr. Jackson had not 
sought on-going treatment for his back. (R. at 109). The 
Industrial Commission totally ignores the uncontroverted testimony 
by Mr. Jackson to the effect that it was his industrial injury to 
his back that terminated his work, which such testimony certainly 
constitutes "evidence." In addition, the inability of an injured 
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worker to locate and obtain medical records over 20 years old 
should certainly not be construed against an otherwise perfectly 
valid claim, but significantly, this is precisely what the 
Industrial Commission is asking this Court to do. Similarly, the 
fact that he has not required on-going medical care does not in any 
way diminish a finding of medical causation, and the Industrial 
Commission's attempt by innuendo clearly misses the mark but 
demonstrates the improper approach it inaugurated in this case. 
And sixth, the Industrial Commission's suggestion that Dr. 
Hess' Report resulted in his concluding that Mr. Jackson's "... 
back condition has improved over the years since his injury ..." is 
a clear misreading of Dr. Hess' Report. (R. at 110). Mr. Jackson 
was awarded a 10% whole body permanent, partial impairment by the 
Employer, and Dr. Hess found that that impairment had increased to 
12%. (R. at 186). He nevertheless attributed half of that 
impairment to the industrial accident and half to pre-existing 
conditions. Significantly, however, the Industrial Commission mis-
characterized the impairment, but that mis-characterization 
nevertheless indicates, once again, its improper approach to this 
industrial claim. 
The attempt to assign Mr. Jackson's pulmonary condition as the 
causation for his total disability is nothing more than a ruse to 
get out of paying benefits and is simply not supported by the 
record. The entire underlying basis of the Order is fundamentally 
flawed. The "findings" and "conclusions" do not evidence "humane 
lfl 
and beneficent purposes" as required by law and the final agency 
action fails due to this conceptual flaw. 
II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO FIND THAT PETITIONER 
EXPERIENCED A COMPENSABLE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT, 
As noted above, the law is clear and overwhelming in this 
jurisdiction that the Workman's Compensation Act is to be applied 
liberally and in favor of awarding benefits, with all doubts being 
resolved in favor of the injured worker. Heaton v. Second Injury 
Fund, supra. This principle of construction is not only to be 
applied to the application of law, but also to the reasonable 
inferences which can be drawn from the facts. Therefore, Mr. 
Jackson is entitled to have all doubts as to whether he sustained 
a compensable industrial injury as a result of the events of April 
10, 1972 resolved in his favor. 
In order to establish that he has suffered a compensable 
injury under the Workers' Compensation Act, Mr. Jackson need show 
that the injury occurred by accident, and that there is a causal 
connection between the injury and his employment activities. Sisco 
Hilte v. Industrial Commission, 766 P.2d 1089 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In the landmark case of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986), the Supreme Court defined what constitutes an accident 
pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act, stating as follows: 
For purpose of worker's compensation, the key requirement 
of an 'accident' is that the occurrence be unanticipated, 
unplanned and unintended; where either cause of injury or 
result of exertion is different from what would normally 
be expected to occur, occurrence is unplanned, 
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unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by 'accident'. Id. 
at 21. 
Mr. Jackson testified that he suffered an industrial accident 
when he was removing a hydraulic roof support and stepped on some 
coal injuring his hip which eventually caused severe impairing 
damage to his back. (R. at 40) . His version of the events was 
never rebutted by contrary testimony since no controverting 
witnesses were called to testify. Further, no medical evidence was 
offered by Respondents which would suggest that Mr. Jackson's 
injuries were not at least partially the result of his 1972 
industrial accident. In fact, they paid temporary and permanent 
workers compensation benefits, including medical expenses, for the 
injury to his back. 
The evidence that Mr. Jackson suffered an industrial injury on 
that date was overwhelming and largely unrefuted. Significantly, 
the Employer paid temporary, total and permanent, partial 
disability compensation as well as medical bills for that 
industrial injury. As such, no serious suggestion was made by the 
Employer to dismiss the case because Mr. Jackson did not experience 
an industrial accident. Although the Administrative Law Judge 
found a lack of both legal and medical causation, the Industrial 
Commission focused on the casual relationship between the 
industrial accident and Mr. Jackson's total disability status. In 
fact, the Industrial Commission conceded in preparatory language 
that M... it appears that the Applicant suffered an industrial 
accident and has suffered some permanent impairment therefrom ...." 
(R. at 109). 
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Therefore, it would appear that the Industrial Commission has 
essentially admitted that legal causation has been established in 
this case, and any suggestion to the contrary is misplaced. 
Ill 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO APPLY THE "ODD LOT" 
DOCTRINE TO PETITIONER'S PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY 
CLAIM. AND SUCH APPLICATION RESULTS IN A PRESUMPTION OF 
ENTITLEMENT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REBUTTED. 
Pursuant to well-established case-law, an injured worker may 
be found to be totally disabled if by reason of the disability 
resulting from the injury, the worker cannot perform work of the 
general character that he/she was performing when injured, or any 
other work which a person of his/her capabilities may be able to do 
or learn to do. Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 
(Utah 1984). Brundaae v. IML Freight. Inc.. 622, P.2d 790 (1980). 
Clark v. Interstate Homes. Inc., 604 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1979). 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott. 393 P.2d 800, 801-02 (Utah 
1964). Caillet v. Industrial Commission. 58 P.2d 760 (Utah 1936). 
The Industrial Commission cannot arbitrarily discount competent, 
uncontradicted evidence indicating that the industrial injury was 
the cause of Mr. Jackson's permanent, total disability Kaiser 
Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission.. 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985). 
Frito-Lav. Inc. v. Jacobs. 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984). 
There is essentially no serious dispute that Mr. Jackson 
sustained an industrial injury. The only real issue is whether the 
industrial injury was the cause of his permanent, total disability 
status. 
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Although the Administrative Law Judge bemoans the lack of 
recent medical treatment of the Petitioner, she did not order a 
Medical Panel. The most recent report was that of Dr. Wallace E. 
Hess dated May 30, 1992. Dr. Hess found that Mr. Jackson's 
permanent, partial disability rating for his back had actually 
increased from 10% to 12% on a whole body basis, with 6% impairment 
due to the industrial injury and 6% due to pre-existing 
degenerative changes. (R. at 180-187). 
Mr. Jackson testified that it was the effects of his 
industrial injury to his back which both terminated his work at 
Kaiser Steel, and prevented him from returning to work. He has 
never suggested that his pulmonary condition served as an element 
to his inability to return to work. None of the Respondents have, 
in addition, suggested that his industrial back problem did not at 
least in part serve as a reason for the impairment. Hence, Mr. 
Jackson's 1972 industrial accident may be properly viewed, and 
should have been so viewed by the Industrial Commission, as "the 
straw that broke the camel's back." 
Mr. Jackson did not meaningfully return to work at Kaiser 
Steel, although he attempted on several different occasions to do 
so. He recalls that he was only able to return for approximately 
4-1/2 months, which is certainly not a successful return-to-work 
effort. Because he did not, and the uncontroverted evidence is to 
the effect that he could not, return to work, he is entitled to the 
"odd lot" presumption of permanent and total disability. See 
Marshall, supra. 
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Rebuttal may be satisfied if the Employer can demonstrate that 
Mr. Jackson was able to secure employment of a special nature not 
generally available, or that he was able to perform the duties of 
his employment. No such evidence whatsoever was offered by the 
Respondents in this case. In addition, Respondents failed to 
indicate that Mr. Jackson was a viable candidate for vocational 
rehabilitation or retraining. Therefore, the presumption of 
entitlement was not rebutted in this case as a matter of law, and 
Mr. Jackson is consequently entitled to Section 67 benefits. 
A review of the medical evidence concerning Petitionees 
industrial problems is further illuminating. 
Dr. Seth E. Smoot's reports clearly indicate that the reason 
Mr. Jackson was off work was due to his back injury and not due to 
any pulmonary condition. (R. at 190) . 
Dr. Paul R. Milligan in his orthopedic surgery notes of 
February 13, 1973 confirms that Mr. Jackson injured himself as a 
result of his stepping on a chunk of coal, (R. at 221) , a fact for 
which the Administrative Law Judge incorrectly claimed there was no 
support in the record. (See R. at 40) . Dr Mulligan states as 
follows: 
I doubt that it will be physically feasible for this man 
to continue working in the mines for much longer. It is 
my opinion that he is not a candidate for surgical 
intervention. I do feel that he should be restricted in 
stooping and heavy lifting. I would estimate this 
patient's permanent impairment of physical function on 
the basis of his lumbar spine as 20% of his total body 
function. (R. at 222). (Emphasis added) 
Although Dr. Mulligan noted Mr. Jackson's "miners7 lung", he found 
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that he could not work due to his back problems which were caused 
by his industrial injury. (R. at 222). 
Dr. Robert H. Lamb's Discharge Summary dated April 8, 1974 notes 
as follows: 
This is a 55 year old male admitted with low back pain. 
The patient had sustained a lifting injury when he 
slipped working in a mine, twisting his back on the 10th 
of April 1972. Since that time the patient had rather 
persistent low back pain with some occasional sciatica on 
both sides, greater on the left. He also had some 
bilateral paresthesia. (R at 198). (Emphasis added.) 
Dr. Lamb further noted Petitioner's complaints of shortness of 
breath; however his final diagnosis was degenerative lumbar spine 
without any emphasis much less reference to the Petitioner's 
pulmonary condition as being a contributing - major or minor -
factor to either his medical condition or his employability. (R at 
198) . 
Dr. Stephen A. Lawson in August 15, 1980 also noted both low 
back problems as well as shortness of breath, but failed to find 
that Petitioner's primary problem or at least the problem which was 
preventing him from working, was pulmonary in nature. He reflected 
that at that particular point in time - eight years after the 
industrial injury - Mr. Jackson was disabled due to both his 
orthopedic as well as his pulmonary condition. (R. at 202) . 
However, Mr. Jackson's pulmonary condition in 1980 is not 
necessarily reflective of what it was eight years earlier at the 
time of his industrial injury, and the records simply do not 
reflect the presence of any meaningful breathing problem before the 
industrial accident occurred. 
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Finally, Mr. Jackson7s Social Security total Disability 
application and file shows that his breathing problems were only a 
contributing cause and that the main or precipitating reason that 
he was unable to work was his 1972 industrial injury to his back. 
(R at 216-233). 
Therefore, Mr. Jackson has established his entitlement to 
permanent, total disability as an "odd lot" injured worker. His 
presumption inherent in that doctrine has not been rebutted as a 
matter of law and an appropriate award of benefits should be 
issued. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the 
Industrial Commission erred when it entered its November 3, 1992 
Order dismissing Mr. Jackson's claim for permanent, total 
disability benefits for lack of medical causation. The 
uncontroverted evidence submitted to the Industrial Commission 
supports the finding that he sustained a significant impairment due 
to his 1972 industrial accident, and is now permanently and totally 
disabled due to his industrial injury. To the extent there is any 
doubt or confusion as to medical causation, it was error for the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the claim. 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand 
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to award 
17 
him permanent, total disability benefits based on 
uncontroverted facts and medical evidence jor-esremfced. 
DATED this 22nd day of March, 1993 
DABN^Y & DABNEY, /&.q. 
the 
VIRG^p«JS-TDABNEY /\USQ. 
Attorney for Petit ioner 
IS. 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 22nd day 
of March, 1993 to the following: 
Utah Court of Appeals (1 original & 7 copies) 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq. 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 South 300 East 
Post Office Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Erie V, Boorman, Esq. 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
201 South Main, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-208 
Mr. Earl C. Jackson 
Post Office Box 645 
East Carbon, Utah 84520 
File 
(2 copies) 
(2 copies) 
(2 copies) 
(1 copy) 
DABNEY & DABNEY,\p. 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A; Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1971). 
EXHIBIT B: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
(July 28, 1992). 
EXHIBIT C; Order Denying Motion for Review (November 3, 1992). 
aa 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability benefits—Vocational rehabilitation 
—Maximum benefit. 
In cases of permanent total disability the award shall be 60% of the 
average weekly wages for five years from date of injury, and thereafter 
45% of such average weekly wages, but not to exceed a maximum of $54 
per week and not less than $29 per week, plus $5 for a dependent wife 
and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children; provided, however, that 
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance 
carrier be required to pay more than $24,648; and provided further, that 
a finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all 
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceed-
ings have been had: 
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and 
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation 
under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall 
be the duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabili-
tation division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68, 
not to exceed $890 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such em-
ployee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally 
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the 
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the 
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education 
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that such em-
ployee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation 
in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the 
employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that 
there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 45% of 
his average weekly earnings, but not to exceed $54 per week, out of that 
special fund provided for by section 35-1-68, for such period of time be-
ginning with the time that the payments (as in this section provided) 
to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and end-
ing with the death of the employee. No employee, however, shall be en-
titled to any such payments if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the 
division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein. 
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally 
disabled and now receiving compensation benefits from the special fund 
provided for by section 35-1-68 shall be paid compensation benefits at 
the rate of $44 per week. This section shall apply to all persons perma-
nently and totally disabled who are now receiving or hereafter become 
entitled to receive compensation benefits from the special fund. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of 
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commis-
sion of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and there-
upon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an oppor-
tunity to be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding 
such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall 
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according 
to the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent 
total disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, 
however, and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where 
there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon par-
tial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind including loss of function, in 
excess of $24,648. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on June 
23, 1992, at 8:30 o'clock a.m. Said hearing 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative 
Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and represented by 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants, Kaiser Steel and Uninsured 
Employers' Fund, were represented by Edwin Barnes 
Attorney at Law. The defendant Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund was represented by Erie Boorman, 
Administrator and Attorney at Law. 
This is a claim for permanent and total disability filed in 
connection with a back injury on April 10, 1972. Applicant claims 
that injury rendered him unable to work, and he has not worked 
since 1973. Defendants admit the occurrence of the 1972 industrial 
injury but deny that applicant is permanently and totally disabled, 
and also deny that the 197 2 injury caused any permanent and total 
disability. Temporary total disability compensation, medical 
benefits, and a 10% permanent partial impairment rating were paid 
to applicant by Kaiser Steel in connection with the 1972 injury. 
An evidentiary hearing was held, during which oral and written 
evidence was presented. At the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement by the 
Administrative Law Judge. Having been fully advised in the 
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Earl Jackson is presently a 74-year-old man who has not worked 
in nineteen years. He worked as a coal miner his entire working 
life, except for a three-year military stint during World War II. 
In 1972, Jackson was employed by Kaiser Steel in the No. 3 mine in 
central Utah as a loader/operator. He was married with three 
dependent children at the time of injury, and was entitled to the 
maximum compensation rate then in effect, based on his wage rate. 
On April 10, 1972, Jackson was removing a "duke" (a hydraulic 
roof support) in the mine and stepped on a piece of coal. When he 
stepped on the coal he twisted his hip. Jackson testified at the 
hearing that he fell and landed on his right side. The medical 
records prepared contemporaneous with the injury do not mention a 
fall. The physician's report of injury describes the incident as 
"twisting his hip," as does the employer's first report of injury 
(Ex. A-l, p. 1,2.) 
Jackson completed his shift and sought medical treatment 
within several days. He testified that he went to Dr. Smoot at 
East Carbon Clinic the next day. The physician's first report of 
injury states he was first examined on April 14, four days later. 
When asked about this contradiction at the hearing, Jackson 
insisted he went to the doctor the next day and stated that the 
injury actually occurred on April 12, not April 10 as the records 
indicate. 
Dr. Smoot's first report of injury states that Jackson 
suffered from degenerative arthritis of the spine (Ex. A-l, p. 2.) 
Jackson was off work for a period of time following the injury and 
paid temporary total benefits by his employer. He testified that 
he saw Dr. Smoot regularly during the next year, but no medical 
records were provided. 
Jackson testified that he attempted to return to work at 
Kaiser's mine several times during the period 1972-1973 but was 
unable to work more than three or four weeks at a time. He 
estimated he worked an overall total of 4 1/2 months during that 
year. He stated that pain in his back and legs made working in 
"low coal" (coal seams from 52" to 58" high) difficult. 
In April, 1973, Jackson was told by his Kaiser supervisor that 
he could not return to work with a light duty release from Dr. 
Smoot, because light duty was unavailable at the mine. Jackson 
testified that he was under the impression that Dr. Smoot "totaled 
him out" at that time, and rendered him permanently unable to work. 
There are no supporting records of Dr. Smoot in the record. 
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Jackson then applied for Social Security disability benefits, 
a miner's pension, and black lung benefits. He was awarded all 
three. He did not seek work again. 
Jackson testified that he had not experienced any problems 
with his back or breathing prior to 1972. The medical records of 
Dr. Wright report a "fractured back 1950" but Jackson denied that. 
(Ex. A-l, p. 25.) The medical records of Dr. Lawson indicate 
Jackson suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in 
1974, as well as degenerative disc disease, an ulcer and possible 
coronary heart disease. Dr. Lawson considered Jackson's pulmonary 
condition and back and leg pain to be his "principle disabling 
conditions" in 1974, but does not mention a causal link with the 
accident (Ex. A-l, pgs. 17, 8, 16.) 
The Social Security records indicate that Jackson was awarded 
disability based on a pulmonary and back condition that was 
disabling in 1973, (Ex. A-l, p. 34.) but in his testimony, Jackson 
repeatedly denied breathing problems in 1973. 
In 1989 Jackson injured his shoulder in a car accident when 
his vehicle was hit from behind. He told Dr. Hess that Dr. Heiner 
performed surgery on the shoulder but no medical records were 
available. Similarly, Jackson testified to neck surgery in 1988 
but no medical records were available. Jackson testified that he 
smoked a pack of cigarettes per day from the time he was fifteen 
years old until approximately two years ago. 
There is no evidence of recent medical treatment obtained by 
Jackson. He was examined by Dr. Wallace Hess on May 30, 1992 at 
the request of applicant's counsel. Dr. Hess made an extensive 
review of medical records — including some records not provided to 
the Commission in the hearing record — and concluded that 
Jackson's back condition had actually improved since he stopped 
working 19 years ago. He rated him with 6% impairment due to the 
industrial injury and 6% for pre-existing degenerative changes. He 
also opined that Jackson had ratable impairments in the form of his 
non-industrial conditions: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
and his shoulder and neck problems. (Ex. A-2.) Dr. Hess also noted 
that Jackson had severe shortness of breath during the examination 
and wrote, "It would appear to this examiner that of his two main 
complaints, the shortness of breath was his prime problem." 
During Jackson's testimony at the hearing, he denied 
difficulty breathing, and stated he was able to breathe and walk up 
to a mile "if I had to." He also disputed Dr. Hess7 observation 
that Jackson had told the doctor that he was unable to walk 1/4 of 
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a block. The Administrative Law Judge observed that Jackson did 
appear to have difficulty breathing during his testimony, but was 
able to testify without interruption for approximately one hour. 
Jackson's attorney stated at the beginning of the hearing that 
his client delayed filing a permanent, total disability claim for 
nineteen years because he "just didn't get around to it." 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant has not met his burden of proving that the 1972 
industrial accident was the cause of his permanent and total 
disability. The Administrative Law Judge has concluded that — 
even if the evidence were viewed in the light most favorable to the 
applicant and he were found to be permanently and totally disabled 
— the true cause of his disability was not the 1972 back injury. 
Instead, the role of his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and 
lung condition appears to be more substantial. 
This conclusion is supported by the following evidence: that 
Jackson began receiving black lung and other disability benefits in 
the early 1970s on the basis of pulmonary condition, that he has 
not received any ongoing medical treatment for his back, that Dr. 
Lawson found that the pulmonary condition was disabling as early as 
1974, that Dr. Hess opines that Jackson's back has not worsened but 
improved, and finally, that Dr. Hess finds the lung condition to be 
his major problem. 
The question before the Commission is whether or not the 
industrial injury occurring on April 10, 1972 was a significant 
cause of Applicants permanent and total disability status. The 
inquiry into causation of Applicant's disability is governed by 
case law set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986) and its progeny. As noted by the Court of Appeals, the 
industrial accident need not be the "proximate cause" of the 
disability, but merely a "dominant" or "significant" cause. Large 
v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988). 
In the case herein, there are medical records of 
incapacitating physical problems which are unrelated to Jackson's 
industrial accident. His lung condition was the basis for several 
types of disability benefits and in fact, appeared to the 
Administrative Law Judge to continue to hamper him at the time of 
hearing. Although Jackson denies breathing problems in the early 
1970's, that testimony is not credible when viewed together with 
the fact that Jackson applied for black lung disability and other 
benefits in the early 1970's and ceased working at that time. The 
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several inconsistencies in Jackson's testimony, together with the 
unexplained 19-year delay in applying for workers' compensation 
permanent and total disability benefits, also render his claim less 
credible. 
After reviewing the above findings of fact, the Administrative 
Law Judge finds insufficient evidence of both legal and medical 
causation to rule that the industrial accident was a significant 
cause of Applicant's permanent and total disability. 
This case is somewhat analogous to Hodges v. Western Piling 
and Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986), wherein an applicant 
was denied permanent and total disability benefits on the grounds 
of causation. In that case, medical evidence established that the 
applicant would be "one hundred percent impaired as a result of 
arthritis alone..." Id. at 721. The record in this case indicates 
that Jackson may have been capacitated due to his breathing 
problems alone, and that they had a very practical and measurable 
impact on his ability to work. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of permanent and total 
disability of Earl Jackson in connection with his April 10, 1972 
industrial injury is denied for lack of causation, and the same is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
Certified thisJ^j^Lday of 
ATTEST: 
Ix^ cx .xc-j-z/r. Patricia 0. Ashby 
Commission Secretary, 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Lisa-Michele Church 
Administrative Law Judge 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Earl C. Jackson, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
* 
Kaiser Steel Corporation, * 
Uninsured Employers Fund, and/or* 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, * 
* 
Respondents• * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah issues this order pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-78 and Section 63-46b-12. 
Applicant timely filed this motion for review of the order of 
the administrative law judge (ALJ) in the above referenced matter 
dated July 28, 1992. Said order denied the applicant's claim for 
permanent total disability benefits for a back injury suffered 
during an industrial accident on or about April 10, 1972. 
I. DID THE ALJ ERR BY HER FAILURE TO 
CONSTRUE THE WORKERS COMPENSATION STATUTE 
LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE APPLICANT? 
The applicant claims that the ALJ erred in her failure to 
construe the workers compensation act liberally in favor of 
awarding benefits to the applicant. He asserts that a long history 
of Utah workers compensation case law supports his view that any 
doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the 
claim. The respondent notes that the Utah courts have required 
liberal construction of the workers compensation statute and 
resolution of doubts in favor of the applicant in situations where 
the evidence on both sides is equally probative. However, there is 
no requirement that an applicant be awarded benefits when he has 
failed to present evidence to show the requisite causal connection 
between his disabling condition and his industrial accident. 
The cases cited by the applicant in support of his motion for 
review relate to the general principles behind the proper 
construction of the workers compensation statute. The Utah Supreme 
Court has noted that "the right to compensation arises out of the 
relation existing between employer and employee, and that the 
injury arises out of and in the course of employment." Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020, 1021 (Utah 1919). Nothing in 
the analysis of the purposes of the workers compensation act 
presented in Chandler supports the notion that an employee who 
cannot establish a causal connection between his disability and his 
employment is entitled to benefits. 
The question at issue in this case is whether the applicant, 
who is already receiving benefits for black lung and social 
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security disability, is entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits for his industrial back injury. The applicant has 
produced no evidence regarding the extent of his disability from 
his treating physician. The medical evaluation conducted at the 
request of the commission back in 1973 gave the applicant a 10% 
permanent partial impairment rating. In an evaluation conducted by 
Dr. Hess based upon an extensive review of medical records, the 
applicant was given a 6% impairment rating based upon the 
industrial accident and 6% based upon pre-existing degenerative 
changes. Even the most generous construction of the statute and 
resolution of doubt in favor of the applicant would not support a 
finding of permanent total disability as a result of the 
applicant's 1972 industrial accident. 
II. DID THE ALJ ERR IN FAILING TO ADDRESS 
THE ISSUE OF THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE APPLICANT'S INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND HIS 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY? 
The applicant asserts that the ALJ failed to address the 
causal relationship between the applicant's permanent total 
disability and his industrial accident. Our review of the record 
indicates that the ALJ adequately addressed the issues of medical 
and legal causation. Under the analyses set out in Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (1986) and Large v. Howard 
Trucking, 758 P.2d 954 (1988), a claimant must show that he was 
injured by accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment and that his disability is causally related to his 
industrial accident. The applicant has not met this burden. While 
it appears that the applicant suffered an industrial accident and 
has suffered some permanent impairment therefrom, the medical 
causal connection between the industrial accident and the 
applicant's permanent total disability is tenuous at best. 
The applicant must "prove the disability is medically the 
result of an exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related 
activity." Allen at 27. "In the event the claimant cannot show a 
medical causal connection, compensation should be denied. Id. The 
applicant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
disability was medically caused by his industrial injury. Large at 
956. The evidence in the record is insufficient to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the applicant's disability is 
causally related to his industrial accident. 
Examination of the record indicates that there was little 
evidence to support a finding of medical causation. The applicant 
failed to produce the medical records of Dr. Smoot, his treating 
physician, for the period immediately following the industrial 
accident. The record further shows that the applicant has not 
received any ongoing treatment for his back injury although he has 
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been repeatedly evaluated by a number of physicians. Dr. Smoot's 
First Report of Injury states that Jackson suffered from 
degenerative arthritis of the spine (Exhibit A-l, p.2). Dr. 
Milligan, in February 1973, diagnosed degenerative arthritis of the 
lumbar spine. (Exhibit D, Motion for Review). Dr. Lawson, in 
1974, indicated that the applicant suffered from chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, as well as degenerative disc 
disease, an ulcer, and possible coronary heart disease. Dr. Lawson 
considered Jackson's pulmonary condition and back and leg pain to 
be his principle disabling conditions in 1974, but did not mention 
a causal connection with the industrial accident. (Exhibit A-l, 
pp. 8, 16, 17). Dr. Lamb, in April 1974, diagnosed lumbar disc 
disease, emphysema and chronic bronchitis. (Medical Exhibit E). 
Dr. Stephen Lawson in April 1974, diagnosed chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, which was moderate to moderately severe, as well 
as degenerative disease of the lumbar spine with old compression 
fractures and probable nerve root irritation. (Medical Exhibit F) . 
Pulmonary function tests conducted at Holy Cross Hospital by 
Dr. Simons in August 1980 show that the applicant has moderate 
obstructive airway disease (Medical Record Exhibit H) . In July 
1980, Dr. Watts of Utah Valley Hospital, read the applicant's x-
rays to show slight scoliosis of the lumbar spine with associated 
degenerative changes. (Medical Record Exhibit I) . A report by Dr. 
Wright, in June 1980, mentions that the applicant fractured his 
back in 1950 and has some tenderness over his lumbar spine with no 
swelling, deformity or limitation of movement. He further noted 
that the applicant had disabling pulmonary disease. (Medical 
Records Exhibit K). Dr. Goldstein in February 1981 diagnosed nerve 
root irritation in the lower lumbar region and moderate 
degenerative changes to the lumbar spine. (Medical Exhibit G). 
Dr. Hess, in 1992, reviewed the applicant's medical records 
and concluded that the applicant's back condition has improved over 
the years since his injury and found that the applicant's lung 
condition is currently his "major" problem. He rated the 
applicant's impairment at 6% from the industrial accident and 6% 
from pre-existing degenerative changes. (Exhibit A-2). 
The applicant testified that he was unable to return to work 
after the accident solely because of the pain in his back and legs. 
However, soon after the applicant received his lump sum workers 
compensation award for permanent partial disability, he applied for 
and received social security disability benefits for his pulmonary 
and back conditions as well as black lung disability benefits. 
Although the applicant repeatedly denied that he had breathing 
problems in 1973, he was awarded black lung benefits which requires 
a finding of "total disability" under federal law. A living miner 
is considered "totally disabled" when "pneumoconiosis prevents 
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him or her from engaging in gainful employment requiring the skills 
and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine or 
mines in which he or she previously engaged with some regularity 
and over a substantial period of time." 30 USC section 902(f)(1); 
Bohn v. Harris, 494 F.Supp. 101, 104 (D. Utah 1980). 
In addition, despite the applicant's claim that he had no 
difficulty breathing, the ALJ observed that he did appear to have 
difficulty breathing during his testimony, although he was able to 
testify without interruption for approximately one hour. The 
applicant's only explanation for his nineteen year delay in filing 
a claim for permanent total disability was that he "just didn't get 
around to it." Therefore, the evidence in the record supports the 
ALJ's conclusion that the applicant's total disability during the 
period subsequent to his industrial accident was the result of his 
pulmonary problems rather than his industrial back injury. 
III. ARE THE ALJ'S CONCLUSIONS SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE? 
The applicant asserts that the ALJ's Order fails to delineate 
adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the 
ALJ's Order in light of Adams v. Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 18 (1991) , indicates that the ALJ made findings sufficient to 
"disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual conclusions, or 
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached." Milne Truck 
Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
1979) cited in Adams, at 20. The ALJ's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are sufficient to show what issues were decided, 
the legal interpretations and applications made, as well as the 
subsidiary factual findings which support her decision. See Adams 
at 21. 
The ALJ's findings of fact are similar to those recited by the 
applicant in his motion for review. However, the applicant's 
version of the facts fails to discuss the inconsistencies and 
contradictions between the applicant's testimony and the medical 
evidence. Although the applicant denied having breathing problems 
back in 1972-73, the medical evidence details that the applicant 
was experiencing pulmonary difficulties. Although the applicant 
denied having these problems at the hearing, it appeared to the ALJ 
that he was, in fact experiencing some difficulties with his 
breathing. The applicant is receiving benefits for disability from 
the Social Security Administration for his pulmonary disease and 
his back condition as well as black lung benefits for pulmonary 
disease. A prerequisite for receiving black lung benefits is that 
the claimant be unable to perform his usual work because of his 
pulmonary disorder. 
The applicant's complaint that the ALJ failed to convene a 
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medical panel is likewise without merit because a panel evaluated 
the applicant in 1973 and ruled that he was only 10% impaired. In 
the 1992 medical examination, Dr. Hess determined that the 
applicant was only 6% impaired due to his industrial injury. In 
addition, there was no conflicting medical evidence in the record 
to bring into question the issue of medical causation. Referral of 
a matter to a medical panel on an industrial injury claim is within 
the discretion of the commission pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-77 and 
Utah Administrative Code R568-1-9 (1992). We do not believe that 
referral to a medical panel was warranted in this case. 
We believe that there is substantial evidence in the record 
to support the ALJ's conclusion that the applicant was and is 
permanently and totally disabled as a result of his pulmonary 
condition and not his industrial back injury. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the administrative law judge 
dated July 28, 1992 is hereby affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a 
transcript of the hearing for appeaJ^ purposes, 
Stephen M. H&dl 
Chairman 
y& )C\IULJ J 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
C6lleen S. Colt'on 
Commissioner 
Certified t h i s 4 ^ day of^Y^nd^jLu 1 9 9 2 
Patricia 0. Ashb 
Commission Secret 
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